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Abstract
This paper examines alternative ways to prevent losses from bank insolvencies. It is widely viewed
that transparency in reporting bank balance sheets is a key element in reducing such losses. It is,
however, unclear just how such transparency would be achieved. Current approaches to avoiding in-
solvencies generally involve international enforcement mechanisms. Among these are the sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), and, more generally, an international bankruptcy court.
We develop a model that compares two alternative institutions for bank auditing. Neither of
these institutions would require as much enforcement capability as an international bankruptcy
court, hence they would be easier to introduce. The ﬁrst of these is a system of central bank
auditing of national banks. The second type of auditing is carried out by an international agency
that collects risk information on banks in all countries and then provides it to depositors. Using a
game-theoretic approach, we compare the informativeness of the disclosure rule in the symmetric
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in each of the two diﬀerent auditing institutions. We show that
the international auditor generally performs at least as well, and sometimes better than, auditing
by either central banks, which, in turn, perform better than voluntary disclosure by the banks
themselves. The results do not assume any informational advantages of the international auditor,
nor is the international auditor somehow less “corrupt" than the central banks. Rather, the
international auditor’s credibility comes from the simple fact that its incentives are not distorted
by a sovereignty bias that plagues the central banks.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aim of this paper is to analyze alternative ways to prevent depositor losses from
bank insolvencies. There is a general view within the current literature on the “new ﬁnancial
architecture” that openness and transparency in reporting bank balance sheets, as well as
other ﬁnancial data, is a key element in preventing such insolvencies. To quote Eichengreen
(1999), “For ﬁnancial crises, as for health maintenance, prevention is the better part of the
cure... Better information on the economic and ﬁnancial aﬀairs of governments, banks, and
corporations will strengthen the market discipline... and help policymakers to identify the
need for corrective action.”
It is, however, unclear, just how such transparency can be achieved. For one thing,
why should banks, in the absence of some regulatory or auditing agency, willingly provide
truthful information about their ﬁnancial situation? Since risk averse depositors usually
prefer to avoid high risk banks with shaky balance sheets, one could easily see that there
are large incentives for those banks to misrepresent their balance sheets. However, without
accurate and credible information, the repurcussions for investment and hence real income
growth could be severe.
There are two current approaches to the issue of bank insolvencies with international
repercussions. The ﬁrst of these is the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM).
This is essentially a cooperative mechanism that is supposed to give debtors and creditors
incentives to restructure unsustainable debt.1 Among the many characteristics of this
mechanism is the notion that it would allow a debtor country and a majority of its creditors
to reach a restructuring agreement that would be binding on all of its creditors. Thus
there would be no side deals or holdouts. Another characteristic of the SDRM is that it
should deter litigation. This would happen because anything that a creditor were to receive
by litigation would be deducted from the claims he might receive under a restructuring
agreement.
A second, related approach would be to have an international bankruptcy court.2
This court would have certain enforcement powers, in much the same way as a domestic
bankruptcy court has some powers. Given the sovereignty of debtors, the international court
would almost certainly have less power than would a domestic court over domestic debtors.
The most basic, intuitive idea of the role of the court is, as above, that it could introduce
a standstill, after a default or potential default, and thereby prevent a country run. Thus
a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) style panic would be avoided. In addition, the court would
have the power to prevent creditors from forcing repayment, thereby destroying the debtor
economy.
1See, for example, "Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM): A Fact Sheet",
January 2003 on the IMF website. This discusses the characteristics and possible beneﬁts of an SDRM.
2This is described in Eaton (2002), Krueger (2001), and Rogoﬀ and Zettelmeyer (2002), among other
places.
1Naturally, a more detailed description of the SDRM and the international bankruptcy
court ideas would be considerably more complex than what we have given above. Nonethe-
less, a key characteristic of both of these related mechanisms is that they are essentially
backwards looking. That is, they are designed to remedy failures after the failures have
occurred. Of course, arguments can be made that the existence of the relevant international
institutions may reduce tendencies of banks to fail. Still, these mechanisms do not provide
an obvious channel for depositors to avoid potentially failing banks, or, indeed, for banks
to be deterred from overly risky behavior.
So what is needed to both reduce the likelihood of bank failures as well as im-
prove the welfare of the economy? Kletzer (1984) provides some guidance on this issue. He
emphasizes the importance of debt data for the eﬃcient functioning of markets. On the
other hand, such data is generally not available, or if available is not reliable. To quote
Eaton (2002), “A deﬁciency more glaring and immediate than the absence of an interna-
tional bankruptcy court is the absence of a data authority providing timely and accurate
information on sovereign debt.... The World Bank in its participation in the HIPC (Highly
Indebted Poor Country) initiative to provide very poor countries relief from oﬃcial debt
conducts a comprehensive debt inventory. This methodology should be extended to all
sovereign debtors and should apply to debts from both oﬃcial and private sources.”
Who should provide such information? One possibility would be private rating agencies
or private auditors who might give risk assessments of banks. As the recent experience
of Enron and others shows, there is a signiﬁcant risk that such auditors will be captured
by their clients. Also, from a purely modeling perspective, it is diﬃcult to explain why
private auditors would oﬀer information on all banks in all countries. That is, how should
their proﬁt motive be determined? In addition, it would be quite diﬃcult to model the
depositors’, or banks’, payments to auditors who may have diﬀerent national coverages.
Accordingly, we will focus only on auditing by non-proﬁt maximizing public agencies, using
the following approach.
This paper develops a simple model of deposit behavior with bank insolvencies. Its
central focus is on the provision of information and its eﬀect on the deposit behavior of
consumers. In the model, there is a continuum of identical depositors. Depositors have
two consumption dates. Initially, they allocate their ﬁrst period income between present
consumption and bank deposits for future consumption. Their deposits can be spread among
J ex ante identical banks. Hence, depositors face a standard portfolio decision. They desire
to smooth both across time and across banks. Both banks and consumers are potentially
spread across the globe. Each bank oﬀers a promised rate of return on its deposits. However,
banks’ investments are risky, and so the promised return is subject to possible default. After
the investment opportunities are identiﬁed, banks receive idiosyncratic, privately observed
signals of the actual risk characteristics of their potential investments. These signals assess
the probability that a bank can make good on its promises. We refer to the bank’s signal
as its solvency type. A bank’s solvency type could, in principle, be uncovered and disclosed
2by an auditor who properly investigates the banks balance sheets.
We do not, however, assume that such credible disclosure by formally independent audi-
tors is automatic. Hence, the disclosure incentives of the auditor are object of the analysis.
Speciﬁcally, our aim is to analyze the disclosure incentives of two alternative institutions
of bank auditing. The ﬁrst institution is one in which a central bank’s job is to verify the
information provided by national banks in its country to in order to disseminate estimates
of risk to depositors. We call this institution the central bank disclosure regime. In the sec-
ond type of institution, audits will be carried out by an international agency that collects
risk information on banks in all countries, and provides it to depositors. We call this the
international disclosure regime. As a baseline, we compare both regimes to a default: the
voluntary disclosure regime in which banks self-report.
In each of the institutions, the solvency type of each of the banks is subject to disclosure.
Using the language of the literature on cheap talk dating back to the seminal work of
Crawford and Sobel (1982), the present model would be classiﬁed as a multiple sender
model of cheap talk.3 We borrow heavily from the, by now standard, techniques developed
in the cheap talk literature.
The timing is as follows. First, banks oﬀer promised rates of return and receive their
private signals of risk. Next occurs the disclosure of this risk, whatever is the source of
disclosure. Finally, depositors make their portfolio decisions.
Both the domestic central banks as well as the international auditor include consumers
and private banks in their objective functions. An auditor’s bank bias is the welfare weight
that the auditor assigns to the banks relative to the depositors. In each of these institutions,
the disclosure incentives in a symmetric, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium are summarized by a
disclosure rule, a mapping from solvency types to messages.
We measure the performance of a disclosure rule in each of these institutions by mea-
suring its richness. Roughly, one disclosure rule is richer than another if it induces more
information states, i.e, induces more steps, than its alternative. On its own, the notion of
richness is a rather weak ordering of information. Yet, it nevertheless carries implications
for the depositors’ welfare. Speciﬁcally, a result of Crawford and Sobel (1982) applied to
this environment shows that depositors are always better oﬀ ex ante under richer disclosure
rules in equilibrium.
Our main result establishes the superiority of international auditing, other things equal.
The international auditor is shown to be at least as informative – in the sense of richness
of its disclosure – as that of a corresponding central bank auditor with the same bank bias.
3However, our work diﬀers from some most other multi-sender models that we know of. For instance,
Krishna and Morgan (2001) examine a model in which diﬀerent experts send messages on common informa-
tion which is unobserved by the decision maker. By contrast our senders in each institution are disclosing
diﬀerent, uncorrelated, bits of information to the decision maker – the depositor.
3Moreover, for some types of bank bias, the international auditor is strictly more informative
than the corresponding central banks. Consequently, depositors are better oﬀ ex ante under
international auditing, other things equal. Not surprisingly, disclosure rules in both auditing
institutions are more informative than the voluntary disclosure benchmark.
Signiﬁcantly, the results to not assume that the international auditor has any informa-
tional advantage. Nor is the international auditor somehow less “corrupt" than the central
banks. Rather, the international auditor’s credibility comes from the simple fact that its
incentives are not distorted by a sovereignty bias that plagues the central banks. Without
the sovereignty bias, an international auditor exaggerates less the solvency type of any par-
ticular bank, because a bank with artiﬁcially inﬂated solvency rates attracts funds away
from more truly productive banks.
We believe the results carry particular signiﬁcance since we would claim that there is a
much greater likelihood that auditing could be implemented than, for example, an interna-
tional bankruptcy court could be. The bankruptcy court, or as a special case an SDRM,
would have enforcement powers beyond anything currently seen in the world. Our auditors
would have no enforcement power, but would function only as providers of information.
Additionally our model will be forward looking in the sense that it describes a system that
may prevent future crises. This is thus quite unlike the bankruptcy court concept, that acts
primarily as a remedy to insolvencies that have already occurred.
There is relatively little work on policy instruments to prevent bank failures. Morris
(2003) considers a framework in which some ﬁnancing from an international agency, although
it may be less than the value of a country’s indebtedness, may bring about an inﬂow of
capital, thereby avoiding default. The role of information and an international bankruptcy
court is considered in Eaton (2002), although not in the context of a speciﬁcm o d e l .B l e j e r ,
Feldman, and Feltenstein (2002) use a simulation model to examine the eﬀects of monetary
and ﬁscal instruments that react to bank failures. Kletzer and Wright (1999) develop a
model which shows how sovereign debt can be sustained in the absence of legal sanctions, if
a default were to occur. Kletzer (1984) looks at asymmetric information and its implication
for the borrowing of developing countries.
There is a modest literature on accountability in other areas of government. For in-
stance Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) and Maskin and Tirole (2001) study electoral
accountability in its relation to separation of powers in governance. Lagunoﬀ (2002) exam-
ines executive transparency when governments are dynamically inconsistent decision makers.
Laﬀont and Martimort (1999) examine the role of multiple regulatory agencies in achieving
transparency. The present paper is closest in spirit to the last two. As in the Laﬀont and
Martimort (1999) paper, the accountability of a regulatory oversight process is also the
central focus of this paper. As in the model by Lagunoﬀ (2002), we focus on the problems
of disclosure incentives rather than, say, problems of veriﬁability.
42 The Model
We now construct a streamlined model which exhibits two critical features. First, deposits
are essential in order for banks to make investments. Second, privately observed asymmetries
in the eﬀectiveness with which each bank can put deposits to good use creates a demand
for accurate disclosure.
There is a single consumption good and two consumption dates. A global market ex-
ists with J ex ante identical commercial banks and a continuum of identical, risk averse
investors (or “depositors"). The commercial banks are classic ﬁnancial intermediaries: each
commercial bank j =1 ,...,J identiﬁes investment opportunities and oﬀers an interest rate
rj to attract deposits which, in turn, are used to fund these investment opportunities. For
their part, depositors use the banks as vehicles to save in order to smooth across the two
consumption dates.
Signiﬁcantly, the depositors are not concentrated in any particular country. Nor do they
limit their deposits to the banks in their own countries. Hence there is no sovereignty bias
in the decisions of depositors and banks. Depositors search globally for the optimal returns
on their deposits, and each bank’s interest rate is available for all depositors worldwide.
Depositors’ preferences are represented by the utility function
log(c1)+δ log(c2)
for consumption stream (c1,c 2).I nt h eﬁrst consumption date, each depositor must choose
how much of his income I1 to consume and, alternatively, how much to invest in each of
the J commercial banks. Let kj denote the amount a representative depositor chooses to
deposit in bank j =1 ,...,J,a n dl e t
k =( k1,...,k J)
denote the proﬁle of deposits across the J banks. With these deposits the depositor consumes
c1 = I1 −
PJ
j=1 kj in the ﬁrst period. A deposit of kj in the ﬁrst period yields a promise by
the bank to pay (1 + rj)kj in the second period where rj i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ep r o m i s e db y
bank j. Essentially, the depositor’s investment amounts to a purchase of a one period bond.
In the second consumption date, the depositor has income I2 <I 1 w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob e
small enough relative to I1 so that the depositor has a desire to save. He consumes both I2
and the return (1 + rj)kj from a bank j if that bank can make good on its promise.
The commercial banks form an oligopolistic industry. Banks post interest rates, identify
investment opportunities, and collect deposits to make those investments. The speciﬁcs of
a bank’s investment behavior are not modeled in detail here, however, it is critical to note
banks require deposits in order to make investments. Any commercial bank invests the
deposit kj in assets which, if there is no default, produce Akj the following period where
5A>1. Armed with this production technology, a bank j that fulﬁlls it promise has a net
return of [A − (1 + rj)]kj on its deposits.
All banks are ex ante identical when they post their interest rates. The proﬁle of posted
interest rates is
r =( r1,...,r J)
After the rates have been posted, the banks become aware of the actual risk characteristics
of some of their investment opportunities. There is some chance that bank j (fully) defaults
on its promised return of (1 + rj)kj the following period. A random variable, θj, describes
the solvency likelihood of bank j before the second consumption date. Speciﬁcally, 1−θj is
the probability of (full) default by the bank j before the next consumption date. Since θj
is the likelihood of non-default, we will refer to θj as bank j’s solvency rate. Hence, a bank
of solvency rate θj has an expected net return of
Πj(kj,θ j,r j)=θj[A − (1 + rj)]kj. (1)
Note that while θj does aﬀect the expected net return, it does not aﬀect the bank’s interest
rate decision.
A bank’s solvency rate is its type. Solvency rate θj of bank j is assumed to be iid
across banks, and has distribution F on ﬁnite support [0,1]. F is assumed to be common
knowledge among all agents in the model. Once the solvency rates are realized, the J
commercial banks constitute a “diﬀerentiated products" oligopoly as they are diﬀerentiated
by their solvency rates. The proﬁle of solvency rates is
θ =( θ1,...,θ J)
If depositors’ had full information about θ his payoﬀ would be









¯ ¯ ¯ θ,r

 (2)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the kjs that disappear with according to
default probability 1 − θj.
It is assumed, however, that the realized solvency rate θj for bank j is not observed by
the depositor. In the absence of any information about a bank’s solvency rate, the depositor
only knows its ex ante distribution, F. Depositors therefore require accurate disclosure of
the solvency rate in order to make eﬀective savings decisions.
Hence, disclosure in this model concerns disclosure about solvency type. That is, dis-
closure concerns information about potential balance sheets based on the investment op-
portunities the bank has identiﬁed. In the real world, of course, bank behavior takes place
in real time. Banks invest existing deposits that, in turn, produce actual balance sheets
6that may be, hopefully, made available to future depositors before they make their deposit
decisions. Incorporating this dynamic recursive feature about the world would complicate
the model without revealing much more about disclosure incentives. (However, it may be a
useful topic for future research on growth implications.)
We do not model all sources of disclosure. One obvious baseline case is voluntary disclo-
sure by the banks themselves. Another possibility is that disclosure comes from the central
banks, each of which audits its own member banks. Central bank disclosure is institution-
alized in some countries such as the U.S., but it is not universal. Still a third possibility is
that an international auditor audits all the banks and discloses the information.
The incentives for accurate disclosure are the subject of later Sections in the paper.
Whatever its source, let mj denote the disclosed information about bank j’s solvency rate.
We will refer to mj as the message or report on bank j.A p r o ﬁle of reports on all banks
is given by m =( m1,...,m n). In an equilibrium (to be deﬁned shortly), the type of
information gleaned from a report mj depends on the disclosure rule chosen in equilibrium.
Given a disclosure rule, the timing is as follows. First, banks post interest rates. Solvency
rates are then privately realized. Next, disclosure, whatever its source, potentially yields
some information about solvency rates to the depositors. Finally, depositors make their










The “(?)" in the time line above represents the source of external disclosure. In Sections
3-5, this source is either the banks themselves, or the central banks that oversee the activities
of certain of these commercial banks, or an international auditor that oversees the activities
of entire system.
In the following Section, we take up the baseline case in which disclosure, or lack thereof,
is the voluntary decision of banks. Though this case is not so interesting in and of itself, it
provides a useful baseline with which develop the ideas and notation that will be used for
later sections.
73 Voluntary Disclosure by Banks
We now examine the disclosure in more detail. Of particular interest is incentives for
credible disclosure. To begin, suppose that each bank can choose whether or not to reveal
its solvency rate. We refer to this as voluntary disclosure regime. Working backwards, we
deﬁne the strategy rules and equilibria for the voluntary disclosure regime.
3.1 Decision Rules
The depositors are the last decision makers. Since the representative depositor does not
observe θ, he must update based on the external message proﬁle m.L e t¯ F(θ|m) denote his
posterior distribution of types given a message m. In equilibrium, ¯ F is updated using Bayes




U(k,θ,r) d ¯ F(θ|m) (3)
where U is deﬁned by the expression in (2) and where information is updated according to
conditional distribution ¯ F given the external message, m. The depositors’ deposit decision
rule is given by a vector
Φ =( Φ1,...,ΦJ)
where Φj(m,r)=kj is the depositors’ investment in bank j given interest rates r and given
external message proﬁle m. The proﬁle Φ is symmetric if the depositor invests the same
amount in two banks whenever he faces the same interest rates and messages for the two.
In the previous stage, each of the banks choose a message mj contingent on its solvency
type, θj.Adisclosure rule for bank j is a map µj from the set of solvency types, [0,1],t oa
set of possible messages or reports that could be published or otherwise made available to all
depositors. Formally, let mj = µj(θj) denote the message sent to depositors concerning bank
j’s solvency type. For now we restrict attention to disclosure rules that weakly increasing
in the solvency rate. This restriction is intuitive and still allows for a rich class of disclosure
possibilities.
Let µ =( µ1,...,µ J).F o re a c hp r o ﬁle of solvency rates, θ,ap r o ﬁle,
µ(θ)=( µ1(θ1), ..., µ J(θJ)) = ( m1,...,m J)=m
of messages is sent to reveal solvency information about the banks. A symmetric disclosure
rule is one in which µj = µi for all i,j pairs of banks.
Given a deposit rule Φ, the banks may be viewed as engaged in a Bayesian game of
disclosure in which each choice µj is made given the correctly anticipated disclosure rule
8µ−j of the other banks. Consequently, for each solvency type θj of bank j its disclosure rule




Πj(Φj(mj,µ −j(θ),r),θ j,r) dF (4)
Finally, in the initial stage, banks compete by posting interest rates to attract deposits.
Given an anticipated disclosure rule µ a n da na n t i c i p a t e dd e p o s i tr u l eΦ, each bank j chooses
its interest rate rj to maximize its expected net return given the anticipated interest rate




Πj(Φj(µ(θ),r),θ j,r) dF (5)
where Πj is deﬁned by the expression in (1).
3.2 Ranking Information
Before proceeding with the equilibrium, a review of various ways of ranking of the disclosure
rules will prove helpful.
The following deﬁnitions are standard. A disclosure rule µj for bank j is perfectly
informative if it is a strictly monotone function of θj. Notice, in this case, that the depositor
can infer precisely the true solvency rate by simply inverting the function µj,w h i c h ,i n
equilibrium, he/she anticipates correctly. Without loss of generality, we can always assume
that if a perfectly informative disclosure rule is used, the rule is, in fact, the identity,
µj(θj)=θj.A r u l e i s uninformative is µj is a constant function. In that case the same
message is sent regardless of the bank’s true solvency type. Finally, a rule will be called
partially informative if µj is a step function.4 Partially informative disclosure rules, as
illustrated in Figure 2, are characterized by cut-oﬀ types. For example, in the Figure the
cut-oﬀs, a1,a 2 ..., for one of the disclosure rules correspond to types that are indiﬀerent
between reporting the message on the lower and on the upper steps.
Given two disclosure rules, µj and ˆ µj the rule µj is more informative than ˆ µj if the
information partition on θj induced by µj is strictly ﬁner than the one induced by ˆ µj.5
Clearly, this standard ordering of informativeness is partial: some pairs of disclosure rules
cannot be compared this way.
4This deﬁnition evidently rules out intermediate cases in which the rule can be perfectly revealing over
some range, and partially revealing over others. However, when there is a single bank, a well known result of
Crawford and Sobel (1982) apply which show that all equilibrium disclosure rules are partially informative
step functions. Though we do not prove it, we conjecture that their result holds in our environment as well.
5Hence, for any Borel subset B ⊆ [0,1] and message mj such that B = µ−1
j (mj), there exists a message
m0








Figure 2: Disclosure rule µa is richer than disclosure rule µb
A weaker notion will prove more useful when comparing auditing regimes. We will
say that the rule µj has richer information than ˆ µj if the number of distinct messages
induced by µj exceeds that of ˆ µj,t h a ti si f|µj([0,1])| > |ˆ µj([0,1])|.F o r e x a m p l e , µj has
richer information than ˆ µj if the latter is a constant function, and the former gives distinct
values on [0,1/2) and [1/2,1]. Figure 2 displays two partially informative disclosure rules.
Disclosure rule µa with cut-oﬀs in message space given by a1,a 2,a 3,a 4 is clearly richer than
disclosure rule µb with cutoﬀs b1,b 2.
It is easy to show that if µj is more informative than ˆ µj,t h e nµj also has richer informa-
tion than ˆ µj. However the converse does not generally hold. In richer disclosure rules the
messages are more meaningful in the sense that they reveal, on average, a smaller diversity
of possible solvency rates allowing more accurate targeting of the depositor’s investment.
More importantly, a result of Crawford and Sobel (1982) implies that richer disclosure rules
are always preferred, ex ante, by the depositor (Theorem 3, p. 1448, in C-S, (1982)). That




U(Φ(ˆ µ(θ),r),θ,r) dF (6)
10We refer to this property by which richer disclosure rules can be ordered as the Crawford-
Sobel (C-S) Property.
3.3 Equilibrium
A Symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the voluntary disclosure regime,i s
at r i p l e ,(µ,Φ,r ∗),s u c ht h a t(i) the depositor’s rule Φ is symmetric and maximizes (3)
given r and m, (ii) disclosure proﬁle µ is symmetric and each bank’s disclosure proﬁle µj
maximizes (4) given Φ and µ−j, (iii),i n t e r e s tr a t ep r o ﬁle r is symmetric and each bank’s
rate r∗
j maximizes (5) given the depositor’s rule Φ, the disclosure rule µ, and other bank’s
interest rates r∗
−j,a n d ﬁnally (iv) ¯ F satisﬁes Bayes rule for all m in the support of µ.6
There always exists symmetric PBE of the voluntary disclosure regime in which the
disclosure proﬁle is uninformative. For if the depositor believes that messages convey no
information, then Φ is constant over message proﬁles. In that case, proﬁts of the banks are
constant across message proﬁles as well.
Fix a symmetric PBE, (µ,Φ,r ∗). To see how disclosure decisions aﬀect deposit behavior
in this equilibrium, observe, ﬁrst, that since the disclosure of a bank’s solvency rate is chosen
independently of the disclosure any other bank, then for any equilibrium path message
proﬁle, m, (i.e., any m in the range of µ), the contents of an equilibrium message can
always be renormalized to satisfy
mj = E[θj
¯ ¯ ¯ mj]=
Z
θj d ¯ Fj(θj
¯ ¯ ¯ mj) (7)
Naturally, Equation (7) must be consistent with the explicit disclosure rule in equilibrium.
Nest, observe that the message proﬁle m in equilibrium induces a distribution on the set
S of banks that end up solvent after the default risks are realized. The probability that the








(1 − mi ). (8)






For out of equilibrium messages, certain consistency conditions apply. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for
a standard reference.
11Consequently, if (m,r) are a pair that appears on the equilibrium path, then for each
bank j, j =1 ,...,J, Φj(m,r) implicitly solves the depositor’s ﬁrst order condition for an











I2 + kj(1 + rj)+
P
i∈S ki(1 + ri)
#
≤ 0, and
=0 if kj > 0
(9)
We let Φ∗
j(m,r) denote the implicit solution to (9) for any pair (m,r) including out-
of-equilibrium pairs of message and interest rate proﬁles. Clearly, Φj(m,r)=Φ∗
j(m,r) for
equilibrium path pairs (m,r).
The intuition behind Equation (9) is not subtle. It states roughly that the depositor
allocates funds to bank j such that the marginal utility of consumption in the ﬁrst period
is equal to the expected marginal utility of consumption after investment k in the second
period. Notice that the left hand side of this equation is common to all banks and is
increasing in kj for each j. Hence the right hand sides of this condition are equal for all
banks that receive deposits. That is, the expected marginal utility in the second period
from increasing the deposit in bank j is equal to that of bank i.
To summarize, we have
Lemma For any Symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (µ,Φ,r∗) of the voluntary dis-
closure regime, the proﬁle Φ satisﬁes: for each bank j, and each equilibrium path (m,r),
Φj(m,r)=Φ∗
j(m,r) where Φ∗ is the implicit solution to Equation (9). In particular,
Φ∗
j(m,r) is weakly increasing and concave in mj and weakly decreasing in m−j.A n d , i f
Φ∗
j(m,r) > 0,t h e ni ti sad i ﬀerentiably increasing and concave function of rj.
A symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium deposit rule Φj for bank j is illustrated in
Figure 3. The deposit rule Φj in Figure 3 coincides with Φ∗
j along the equilibrium path.
We will call an equilibrium maximally informative if there is no other equilibrium with
disclosure proﬁle, µ0,s u c ht h a tµ0
j has at least as rich information than µj for each bank j,
and has richer information for some bank j.
Is there an equilibrium in which voluntary disclosure rule is informative? The following
result answers in the negative – which is not too surprising. However, it serves as a useful
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Figure 3: A symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium deposit rule 
 
 Proposition 1 Let (µ,Φ,r ∗) be a maximally informative symmetric equilibrium of the game
with voluntary disclosure. Then each µj is uninformative. Consequently, deposit rule induces




















I2 +( j +1 ) ( 1+r∗)λI1/J
(11)
The voluntary disclosure regime therefore produces the same outcomes as if there were
no disclosure at all. Consequently, the representative depositor invests equal amounts in all
banks. Clearly banks cannot be relied on to self report. Some form of external auditing and
disclosure is required.
In the Sections that follow, alternative sources of disclosure are explored. However, the
same notation equilibrium notion, and equilibrium behavior for the depositor’s rule and the
banks’ interest rate proﬁle applies to these cases as well. The only diﬀerence lies in the
information content of the disclosure rules.
4 Central Bank Auditing and Disclosure
A logical starting point for external disclosure is the central banks that oversee the various
commercial banks. We refer to this as the central bank disclosure regime. In each country,
a central bank is usually responsible for the oversight of the activities of its member banks.
Oversight includes, among other things, auditing the bank’s records and disclosing publicly
information pertaining to a bank’s solvency. A central bank’s incentive for credible disclosure
is the subject of this Section.
Because the main issue in this paper is the disclosure incentives, we do not model the
actual costs of auditing. A central bank (CB, from here onward) is assumed to be able
to costlessly verify that solvency risk of its bank. Recall that messages sent by external
auditors – in this case, CBs – are sent before deposit decisions.
For simplicity assume that each commercial bank belongs to a distinct country. There
are then j distinct auditing agencies corresponding to the j central banks. Each central
bank has sovereign responsibility for exactly one commercial bank. A central bank must
therefore weigh utility of depositors from its own country against the proﬁtability of the
member bank in its country. Let βj denote the welfare weight placed on banks. We will
refer to this weight, βj, as the central bank’s bank bias in its objective function. A higher
14bank bias indicates proportionately fewer depositors reside the central bank’s country. If θ
were fully observed, then a central bank with jurisdiction over bank j with bank bias βj has
the full information payoﬀ:
Gj(k,θ,r)=( 1 − βj)U(k,θ,r)+βjΠj(kj,θ j,r)
A lower bank bias βj captures the idea that many of depositors come from that Central
Bank’s country. The U.S. is an example of a country with high concentrations of depositors.
Arguably, its central bank has a lower bank bias then, say, the central bank of the Cayman
Islands whose member bank receives deposits mainly from abroad.
Because the central bank audits its member bank, it evaluates the depositor’s payoﬀ at
t h et r u es o l v e n c yr a t e ,θj.W h e n βj =0 , then the CB’s payoﬀ coincides with that of the
depositor, except that the central bank knows the true solvency rate. When βj =1then
the central bank from country j has the same payoﬀ as its member bank. The intermediate
case is of the most interest.






where the expectation is taken with respect to mj and where βj is the central bank’s bank
bias.
In the following result, we drop the subscript on βj for notational convenience.
Proposition 2 Let (µ,Φ,r ∗) be a maximally informative symmetric equilibrium of the Cen-
tral Bank disclosure regime. For each bank j, the following holds.
1. If β =1 ,t h e nµj is uninformative
2. If β =0 , then each µj is perfectly informative.
3. There exists a ¯ β ∈ [0,1) such that for all β>¯ β, the maximally informative equilibrium
is not perfectly informative.
4. For any sequence, {β(t)}, such that β(t) → ¯ β from above, there exists a strictly
decreasing subsequence, {β(t )},s u c ht h a tµj has richer information the smaller is the
weight, β(t ) in the subsequence of bank biases.
15By the Proposition, the incentives for Central Banks to credibly audit their member
banks are, in many cases, dubious at best. Moreover the quality of the audit is related to
a central bank’s bank bias. Though, Property 4 is not a strict monotonicity result, there is
a monotone sequence along which information is richer the smaller is the bank bias. The
proof in the Appendix recursively constructs a maximally informative equilibrium. From
this construction, one can compute explicitly the maximal number of steps in an equilibrium.
One then shows that this number decreases in the bank bias. By the Crawford and Sobel
Property that orders richer disclosure rules in Equation (6), richer disclosure proﬁles are
preferred, ex ante, by the depositor. Consequently, the depositor is better oﬀ when the bank
bias of a Central Bank is lower.
Since the bank bias measures the lack of domestic investors, the central banks of countries
with a smaller number of domestic depositors (along the sequence of bias weights) are the
least credible auditors. This is a particular concern for developing countries. Such countries
typically do not possess suﬃcient wealth to have large numbers of domestic depositors. At
the same time, sustained development requires investment from abroad. Unfortunately,
these are, arguably, the most problematic cases.
Signiﬁcantly, the problem is not that central banks from developing countries are in-
herently corrupt. The distortion here is created by natural concerns over the viability of
domestic banks to the exclusion of depositors who reside elsewhere. Quite understandably
central banks favor domestic concerns, and so its bank bias is possibly exacerbated by a
sovereignty bias rather than by corruption, per se.
5 International Auditing and Disclosure
This Section takes up the possibility of an international disclosure regime, i.e., an interna-
tional institution that performs the auditing functions formerly done by the central banks.
The international institution audits all the commercial banks. As before, we examine only
the question of disclosure incentives, not the issue of monitoring or veriﬁability. As with
Central banks, we assume that auditing is costless and accurate. The question, as with
Central Banks, is: when is the international auditor’s reporting credible?
The main diﬀerence between the international and domestic auditors is that the former
has no sovereignty bias. In particular, it assigns no special status to any speciﬁc country or








where β is the overall bank bias of the international auditor. Because of the natural sym-
metry of the problem, the speciﬁcation (12) assumes an implied symmetry in the relative
16welfare weights between banks. However, we later argue that the main result below can be
extended to social objectives with asymmetric weights between banks.
Since the international auditor (IA from here on) audits all the banks, it discloses in-
formation simultaneously on the entire proﬁle, θ, of solvency rates. To make sense of this
idea, we assume that an international auditor is a multi-divisional organization, with a dis-
tinct unit simultaneously auditing each bank. Consequently all audits and disclosures are
simultaneous.7 We refer to these units as the auditing divisions of the IA.
Let µI denote the disclosure rule of the IA. We compare this with the equilibrium
disclosure rule, denoted by µC, in the central bank disclosure regime. Given a solvency rate













A Symmetric equilibrium of the game with international auditing is a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, (µI,ΦI,r ∗), such that for each realized solvency proﬁle, θ, (Φ,r ∗) is a sym-
metric PBE of the game given message proﬁle µI(θ). The same deﬁnition of maximally
informativeness as with the Central bank auditing applies here to (µI,ΦI,r ∗).
Our ﬁnal result compares the international to the central bank disclosure regime.
Proposition 3 Let (µI,ΦI,r ∗) be a maximally informative symmetric equilibrium of the
international disclosure regime. Let (µC,ΦC,r∗) be a maximally informative symmetric
equilibrium of the central bank disclosure regime. Then, for each β, the disclosure rule µI
j
has (weakly) richer information than the rule µC
j corresponding to any central bank j with
t h es a m eb a n kb i a sβ. In addition, there is an open set of β in (0,1) such that the disclosure
rule µI
j has richer information than the rule µC
j corresponding to a central bank j with the
same bank bias β.
According to the result, the international auditor is never less credible than a central
bank with the bank bias. And for some bank bias weights, the international auditor is more
credible than the central bank. As before, the proof is constructive. Maximally informative
equilibria in each regime are constructed recursively. Using once again the Crawford-Sobel
Property, it turns out that ceteris parabis, international auditing is at least weakly preferred
to Central Bank auditing by the depositor ex ante. Both regimes distort information up-
ward to some extent. Bank solvency is exaggerated. However, it is exaggerated less under
international auditing than under Central Bank auditing.
7This also allows a fair comparison between domestic and the international audits. Speciﬁcally, we do
not “build in" an informational advantage for the international organization’s auditing capability. To do
so, however, would only strengthen the main results which emphasize the beneﬁts of international auditing.
17The critical diﬀerence is the sovereignty bias associated with central bank disclosure.
An upward distortion in the message of one particular bank’s solvency rate has two eﬀects.
First, it distorts upward the investment in period two consumption by the depositor. Hence,
an upward distortion distorts away from the depositor’s optimal smoothing between the two
consumption dates. If the bank bias is large enough, however, then even an international
auditor does not care about this type of distortion much. However, there is a second eﬀect
which the international auditor does care about: an upward distortion in bank j’s solvency
rate distorts investment away from more proﬁtable investments in other banks. This second
eﬀect is ignored by the central banks due to their sovereignty bias. It is precisely this type
distortion which is mitigated by international auditing.
The intuition here indicates that the result is, in a particular sense, robust with respect
to changes in implied welfare weights between the banks. Currently, all banks are weighted
equally. Suppose, however, some banks were weighted more than others in (12). Suppose
that αj is the relative weight given to bank j among the banks. Then Proposition 3 would
s t i l lb et r u ef o rab a n kj provided that the implied bank bias βαj given to bank j by the
international auditor is the same as the original bank bias given to that bank by its central
bank.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper constructs a model in which an international institution responsible for the
auditing of bank solvency performs at least as well, and sometimes better than, auditing
by either central banks or of the member banks themselves. The results do not require
informational advantages of an international auditor. Nor do they hinge on assumptions of
greater honesty or inscrutability by the international auditor. Instead, the results utilize
the inherent advantages of a decision maker without a sovereignty bias. Unlike the central
banks in most countries, the international auditor does not automatically favor the banks or
depositors in any particular country. We show that sovereignty bias can impede incentives
for credible disclosure in central banks, particularly in those countries with few domestic
investors.
Our results show that the international auditor provides a richer set of information to the
depositor than does self-reporting by banks, or auditing of banks by central banks, assuming
central banks report only on their national member banks. The results of Crawford and
Sobel (1982) show that richer disclosure rules are always preferred by depositors to rules
with weaker information structures. Accordingly, we have, implicitly, a conclusion that
international auditing is welfare improving, as compared to the other mechanisms, in the
sense that expected losses of depositors will be lower.
Our conclusions may be viewed as being complimentary to some recent work on bank
18runs. For example, Peck and Shell (2003) show that for a broad class of deposit contracts, a
bank run can occur in equilibrium. Diamond and Rajan (2001), on the other hand, develop
a model in which depositors discipline bankers by the threat of a run, and in equilibrium
a run does not happen. Our work does not deal with bank runs. However, a mechanism
that reduces expected losses would presumably reduce the threat of bank runs. In addition,
most of the other work in this area is essentially institution free, in the sense that it lacks
regulatory agencies or central bank. The models consist of borrowers, depositors and banks.
We would thus claim that our welfare improving auditing mechanism also adds an element
of realism to the banking models.
As the analysis focuses on disclosure incentives, other issues such as veriﬁability and
moral hazard are not explored here. Moral hazard of bank behavior, in particular, has been
the object of numerous studies. These basically show that banks sometimes take on excessive
risk when their decisions are left unexposed. While we do not model the auditing process
explicitly, one would expect that sovereignty bias exacerbates moral hazard problems as
well. Consequently, moral hazard may also be mitigated by international auditing. These
issues are left for future research.
7P r o o f s o f t h e R e s u l t s
Proof of the Lemma Suppose, ﬁrst, that Φ∗
j(m,r) is a diﬀerentiably increasing and con-
cave function of rj, then the bank’s objective, (5), is concave in rj.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,ﬁrst order
conditions are suﬃcient to characterize optimal decisions for banks. Also, an inspection of
the ﬁrst order condition (9) for depositors reveals that kj is weakly increasing in mj and
weakly decreasing in mi,i6= j.
Next, implicit diﬀerentiation of the depositor’s ﬁrst order condition with respect to























(I2 + kj(1 + rj)+
P
i∈S ki(1 + ri))2


In order to maintain this equality at every proﬁle interest rate proﬁle, r,
∂kj
∂rj must be positive
and declining in rj. Hence, Φ∗
j is positive and concave in rj is it satisﬁes the interior ﬁrst
order condition.
19To verify monotonicity of Φ∗
j in mj, observe that the ﬁrst order condition for the depositor
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In this equation, mj is a strictly increasing, convex function of kj. Consequently, an inverse
exists and is strictly increasing and concave in mj. (Note: this proves that if a function
Φ∗
j satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition on all messages mj, then it is strictly concave in mj
whenever its value is nonzero.) Since Φ∗
j satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition on the disclosed
messages, mj ∈ supp µj, it is increasing on these messages.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 With voluntary disclosure, each bank with solvency rate θj




[A − (1 + r
∗)) ] Φj(mj,µ −j(θ−j)) dF (13)
Notice that any solution to (13) does not depend on the value of θj.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h e
maximizer mj is independent of type regardless of what the depositor believes about the
informativeness of the bank’s message. Consequently, there is some mj such that for which
µj(θj)=mj for all θj. Anticipating this, the depositor infers nothing about the bank’s
message mj and so mj = m0 (recall that m0 is the null message). Finally, the portfolio
decision in the no-disclosure case is fully characterized by (10) and (11)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 Let (µ,Φ,r∗) be a maximally informative, symmetric equilibrium
of the game with Central Bank auditing. Consider a Central Bank from country j.
P r o o fo f( 1 ) . S u p p o s et h a tβ =1 . The CB cares only about its member bank’s prof-
its. Then clearly its objective and the member bank’s objective coincide. The previous
Proposition therefore applies and so the disclosure rule in uninformative.
P r o o fo f( 2 ) .S u p p o s et h a tβ =0 . That is, the CB cares only about the depositors. Sup-
pose, further, that the depositor anticipates a perfectly informative message, i.e., µj(θj)=θj

















∗) d ¯ F(θ| m), the values of the programs of the
Central Bank and the depositor are clearly aligned in expectation (with respect to m−j)
20when mj = θj. Hence, if a perfectly informative disclosure rule, µj(θj)=θj, is anticipated
by the depositor, and so mj = θj maximizes (14).
Proof of (3). Suppose, by contradiction, that for every β ∈ (0,1), the maximally infor-
mative equilibrium is perfectly informative. The depositor then believes that µj is perfectly
informative, and so Φj satisﬁes the ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n ,( 9 )a n d ,b yt h eL e m m a ,i sc o n t i n -








where we write G
β
j(mj,θ j) to express explicit dependence on the bank bias weight, β.
Clearly, G
β




j(mj,θ j).R e c a l l t h a t , b y a
step in the proof of the Lemma, Φj is strictly concave in mj on all open sets for which
the depositor’s ﬁrst order condition holds. In this case, the supposition that µ is perfectly
informative means that the ﬁrst order condition holds everywhere. Consequently, ¯ m
β
j(θj) is
single valued, and by the Theorem of the Maximum, is continuous in β. By the previous











1(1,θ j)=E[Πj(Φ(1,µ −j(θ−j)) ,θ j,r
∗),r
∗)].
In other words, ¯ m0(θj)=θj and ¯ m1(θj)=1 . Consequently, by the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there is 0 < ¯ β<1 such that ¯ m
¯ β(θj)=mj >θ j. Consequently, this is true for all
β ≥ ¯ β. In that case, however, the initial supposition that µj is perfectly informative cannot
constitute an equilibrium disclosure rule, hence, a contradiction.
P r o o fo f( 4 ) .U s i n gt h e¯ β in the proof of (3), suppose that β ≥ ¯ β. Then with bank bias
β, the maximally informative equilibrium is either partially informative or uninformative.
All such equilibria have the following structure.
First, the deposit rule ΦC
j satisﬁes, by the Lemma ΦC
j (mj,r ∗) ≡ Φ∗
j(mj,r ∗) whenever
mj lies in the range of the disclosure rule µC
j (and, recall, that Φ∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
condition, (9) ). Set ΦC
j (mj,r ∗)=0for all other values of mj.I n o t h e r w o r d s , o u t o f
equilibrium messages elicit a belief from the depositor that the bank is of the lowest solvency
type. Hence, the depositor invests nothing in that bank.
Fix a disclosure proﬁle, µ−j, for banks other than bank j.L e tG
β
j(mj,θ j) be deﬁned as
in Equation (15) This is the expected payoﬀ for central bank j when payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e d







zd F = E[z : z ∈ [x,y)] .
21This means that M(x,y) is the message corresponding to the conditional expectation of z
g i v e nt h a ti tl i e si nt h ei n t e r v a l[x,y).











In words, gβ selects the right end of the interval [y,z) such that a bank of solvency type
y is indiﬀerent between reporting a solvency type in [y,z) and a solvency type in the lower
interval [x,y). Hence, the function gβ deﬁnes the partition elements by deﬁning the cut-oﬀ
types.
Observe that by Steps 3 earlier in the proof, gβ is continuous in β. The function g also
deﬁnes second order diﬀerence equation, gβ(zt,z t+1)=zt+2.
Let γβ denote the solution to the diﬀerence equation as a function of the number T of
iterations and the initial condition, z1.T h a ti s ,
γ
β(T,z1)=zT
The maximally informative disclosure rule in the central bank auditing also maximizes
the number of distinct messages, T, consistent with that number satisfying γβ(T,z1)=1 .
Hence, the number of messages in a maximally informative equilibrium, expressed as a
function of β is given by
T






By Steps 1-3 in the proof, we therefore have T0 =1and T β →∞as β → ¯ β.F r o m t h i s
latter sequence of βs, we may extract a monotone subsequence β(t) & ¯ β such that along
the sequence, T β(t) is increasing in t. By construction, then, µj(t) has richer information
than µj(t − 1), ∀t. This concludes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 Consider a bank j with solvency rate θj. Clearly, if β =0 ,
then the disclosure rules in both cases are perfectly informative. Suppose then that β>0.
We use to same characterization of partially informative equilibria as in Step 4 of the
proof of the previous result. For notational comparison between the two regimes, we repeat
the characterization here.
As before, the deposit rule in either regime, i.e., Φj ∈ {ΦC
j ,ΦI
j}, by the Lemma,
Φj(mj,r)=Φ∗
j(mj,r) whenever mj lies in the range of the corresponding disclosure rule
22and where Φ∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition, (9). Consequently, if a message mj lies in
the range of both disclosure rules, µC
j and µI








As before, then, set Φj(mj,r ∗)=0for values of mj not in the range of the disclosure rule.
Out of equilibrium messages elicit a belief from the depositor that the bank is of the lowest
solvency type. Hence, the depositor invests nothing in that bank.














∗(mj,µ −j(θ−j)) ,θ,r) dF−j(θ−j)
These are the expected payoﬀs in each auditing regime when payoﬀsa r ee v a l u a t e da si ft h e y







zd F = E[z : z ∈ [x,y)] .
This means that M(x,y) is the message corresponding to the conditional expectation of z
g i v e nt h a ti tl i e si nt h ei n t e r v a l[x,y).
Again following the construction in Part (4) of the proof of Proposition 2, the partitions


















In words, g and h select the right end of the interval [y,z) such that a bank of solvency
type y is indiﬀerent between reporting a solvency type in [y,z) and a solvency type in the
lower interval [x,y). Hence, the functions g and h deﬁne the partition elements by deﬁning
the cut-oﬀ types.8
Observe that both g and h are increasing in x and y. We prove the Proposition in the
following four Steps.
8The reader will observe that the function g is the same as the deﬁnition of “gβ" in Step 4 of the proof
of Proposition 2. Here, however, we suppress the notational dependence on β.
23Step 1: First, we show that h(x,y) ≤ g(x,y) for all x,y, and the inequality is strict whenever
h(x,y) < 1.
To prove Step 1, observe that by deﬁnition, H∗
j(mj,z) >G ∗
j(mj,z).N e x t , s i n c e Π 
is decreasing in mj for any pair, j, , then by the Lemma, H∗
j and G∗
j are single peaked,









According to this inequality, the marginal net beneﬁt to higher reported solvency for bank
j is higher under Central Bank disclosure than under International auditor disclosure.
These last facts imply that, for any message mj,i fm0
j and m00




















But then taking mj = M(x,y), the deﬁnitions of g and h imply: g(x,y)=z0 with m0
j =
E[z : z ∈ [y,z0)],a n dh(x,y)=z00 with m00
j = E[z : z ∈ [y,z00)]. Consequently, either
h(x,y)=g(x,y)=1 ,o rh(x,y) <g (x,y).I fh(x,y) < 1 the latter case holds. This proves
Step 1. //
Step 2:B o t h g and h deﬁne second order diﬀerence equations:
g(zt,z t+1)=zt+2 and h(zt,z t+1)=z
0
t+2
By Step 1, zt2 >z 0
t+2.L e t g∗ and h∗ denote the solutions to these, as a function of the






The maximally informative disclosure rule in, say, the central bank auditing also maxi-
mizes the number of distinct messages, T g, consistent with that number satisfying g∗(T g,z 1)=
1. Hence, the number of messages, Tg and Th,e a c hs a t i s f y :
T










Recall that T g and Th are the number of messages sent in maximally informative best
responses under central bank and international auditing, respectively. Moreover, if T g =1 ,
then the disclosure rule is uninformative. Whereas if T g = ∞, then the disclosure rule




To prove this claim, observe that h∗(Tg,z
g
1) ≤ g∗(T g,z
g
1)=1 . Step 2 then follows by
deﬁnition of Th.
This proves that for a given proﬁle, µ−j for others, the international auditor’s best
response for bank j has weakly richer information (hence is at least as informative as) than
that of the central bank auditor for bank j./ /
Step 3: Observe that by the previous proposition, T g → 1 as β → 1.L e t βC be the
smallest bank bias such that central bank auditing of j is uninformative. By deﬁnition, the
best response of the central bank auditor is not uninformative for all β<β C.H e n c e ,T g > 1
for all β<β C. For such welfare weights, there exists an initial condition z1 > 1 under g∗
such that g∗(1,z 1) ≤ 1. Notationally, we can express the initial condition as a function of
the welfare weight, i.e., z1(β). Consider the limit taken from below,
z
−
1 =l i m
β ↑ βC z1(β)
Then g∗(1,z
−
1 )=1 ,a n d
G
∗









By Step 1, h(0,z
−
1 ) < 1. Consequently, there is some  >0 such that for welfare weight
β = βC −   and corresponding initial condition, z1(β),w eh a v eh(0,z 1(β))< 1. But for
this β we also have T h > 1. That is, we have established that for small enough  >0,u n d e r
welfare weight β = βC −  , the International auditing can sustain a partially informative
disclosure for bank j, whereas central bank auditing sustains only uninformative disclosure
for that bank. Hence, there is an open set of bank biases for which IA auditing sustains
richer disclosure than for CB auditing given µ−j ./ /
Step 4: Now suppose that µ−j has richer information than a proﬁle ˆ µ−j.L e tg and ˆ g,a n d
h and ˆ h be the corresponding recursive functions which generate maximally informative
25disclosure for international and for central bank auditing, respectively. By the Lemma, the
depositor’s deposit in bank j is smaller under ˆ µ−j, other things equal. Consequently, richer
disclosure of j’s solvency type is required to achieve the same deposit in bank j.M o r e
precisely, from the deﬁnitions of G∗ and H∗ and the constructions of g,ˆ g,h and ˆ h,f o re a c h
x and y, h(x,y) < ˆ h(x,y) and g(x,y) < ˆ g(x,y). But this implies that the partition-deﬁning
sequence generated by µ−j has richer information than that generated by ˆ µ−j.U s i n gµ−j
f o rt h ec e n t r a lb a n kc a s e ,a n dˆ µ−j for the international auditing, we then repeat the Steps
1-3 to show that the resulting µj for bank j under international auditing is richer than the
resulting µj for bank j under central bank auditing. The justiﬁes the initial assignment of
µ−j and ˆ µ−j,r e s p ./ /
We have therefore shown that the maximally informative equilibrium under international
auditing has weakly richer information than that of central bank auditing for all β, and has
strictly richer information for some set of β.W ec o n c l u d et h ep r o o f .
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